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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN
ANGLOPHONIC INDEPENDENT AFRICA
Robert B. Seidman*
The governments of independent Africa took offic'e under constitu-
tions in the main designed by departing colonial civil servants and im-
posed as a condition for independence.1 The Colonial Service, of course,
was authoritarian to the core.2 It distrusted politicians generally-it had
been singularly free of political control throughout the imperial era. It
profoundly distrusted the new African politicians who were about to take
over direction of their own countries.
To control the new men, the Colonial Service put great reliance upon
the paraphernalia of eighteenth century constitutional theory. Free elec-
tions lay at the core. To make these elections possible, the democratic
liberties that the Service had itself so long suppressed were suddenly per-
ceived as essential: free press and speech; freedom of religion; freedom
of association; and freedom from discrimination, unlawful searches and
seizures, arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Only an informed, under-
standing and unintimidated electorate can intelligently choose governors
who will implement a program truly in its interests.
The whole system basically failed in Africa. Governments, by and
large, did not make choices favorable to the interests of the masses. Stag-
nation, not development, was the theme of the Sixties.
The failure resulted in part from the weaknesses of the courts in pro.
tecting fundamental freedoms. But that weakness alone is plainly an
insufficient explanation for the failure of the Development Decade.
What Africa needed most was an accelerator, not a brake on government
activity. In any event, the eighteenth century model was, for twentieth
century Africa, an absurd dream. Noticeable mainly by their absence
were the conditions for democracy's success-a literate, educated and in-
formed populace; traditions of mass involvement in governmental affairs;
and political parties who compete for votes on the basis of principle and
program. That these desiderata have ever been present to ensure the
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1 Seidman, Constitutions in Anglophonic Sub.ahara Arica: Forn; and Leitimacy, 1969
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golden promises of democracy anywhere may well be doubted. Elite
theory has always argued that they were illusory.3
To doubt the centrality of fundamental freedoms to African political
processes, however, is not to say that those freedoms are unimportant
in the African context. Freedom of expression is indispensable to any
government seeking to change social institutions. It is a useful component
of the processes by which government learns the consequences of its own
policies, probably the most important single element in rational decision-
making. It is important if government is to have the advantage of new
ideas, which the bureaucracy and the party are frequently structurally in-
capable of generating. It may be helpful to government in learning the
claims and demands of the populace at large.
The protection of fundamental freedoms in those African constitu-
tions which included them was entrusted to the legal order.4 That pro-
tection rested upon two bases. In the first place, the judges and
prosecutors upon whom the system depended for effectiveness had to be
independent. In the second place, the decision-making system-that is,
the appellate courts-had to be likely to produce decisions favorable to
claims of freedom as against government efforts to restrict them. Each of
these areas in turn will be examined.
I. THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
In common law jurisdictions, prosecutors have probably the broadest
discretion lodged with any public official.' A Maryland court stated the
accepted position:
As a general rule, whether the State's Attorney does or does not in-
stitute a particular prosecution is a matter which rests in his discretion.
Unless the discretion is grossly abused or such duty compelled by statute
or there is a clear showing that such duty exists, mandamus will not lie.6
In Britain, the Director of Public Prosecutions [D.P.P.] has an equally
broad discretion.7 The classical wisdom perceives only the danger of po-
litical influence on discretion. Wherever there is broad discretion, the
potential for corruption and influence is equally broad. The use of the
law against political malefactors, however, depends upon the autonomy
of the legal order, and particularly the criminal justice system. The
3 See generally G. PARRY, POLITICAL ELITES (1969); T. BorroMoRE, ELITES AND SO-
CIETY (1964).
4 Ghana, Tanzania, and Malawi did not include specific human rights provisions in their
independence constitutions.
K. DAVIs, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188 et seq. (1969).
C Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 90, 40 A.2d 319, 321 (1944).
7 R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND, 136-40 (5th ed. 1967).
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D.P.P. in any case can exercise his power to enforce the law only if he is
free of political pressures and in cases against high officials and politicians,
only if he is as autonomous in his position as human ingenuity can devise.
Only so, it is argued, can there be assurance that government itself is un-
der law. In the United States, the difference in vigor in prosecuting po-
litical malefactors between the regular Justice Department officials and
the Special Prosecutors in the Watergate crimes is ample evidence that the
high ideals of political independence of the prosecutors is not ordinarily
achieved here at home. It was not achieved in Africa either, despite paper
constitutional guarantees.
In the Zambia Independence Constitution, for example, the D.P.P.
was specifically made a constitutional officer. Hie was given the unlim-
ited power to institute criminal proceedings against any person, in any
court (except a court-martial) "in which he considers it desirable to do
so." Moreover, these broad powers in the D.P.P. "shall be vested in him
to the exclusion of any other person or authority."
He was to exercise these powers free from "the direction and control
of any other person or authority,"' (save judicial),1° except that in any
case which seemed to the D.P.P. to involve "general considerations of
public policy" he was to bring the case to the attention of the Attorney-
General and abide by his directions." In giving such directions to the
D.P.P., the Attorney-General in turn was declared to be free from the
direction or control of any other person or authority12 save judicial au-
thority. 3
The office of D.P.P. was declared to be a public office.14 The ap-
pointment and removal of its occupant lay within the purview not of po-
litical authorities, but of the independent Public Service Commission.'6
The Constitution provided for tenure for the D.P.P., equivalent to that
of a judge, who could be removed from office only on reaching the age of
sixty, or "for inability to perform the functions of his office (whether aris.
ing from infirmity of body or mind or any other cause) or for misbehav-
iour."' 6  Even then the question of removal of the D.P.P. had to be
tried before a special tribunal consisting of the three persons who had all
8 Zambia: THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, art. 53(4) (1964).
9ld., art. 53(b).
10 Id., art. 125(10).
11 Id., art. 53 (b).
12 Id., art. 52(4).
13 d., art. 125(10).
14 Id., art. 53(1).
15Id., art. 114(3).
16 Id., art. 118(2).
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held high judicial office-under Zambian conditions at independence,
three non-Africans.17
Similar constitutional provisions are liberally sprinkled in all the Afri-
can independence constitutions, except in those of Ghana (1960), Uganda
(1966), and Malawi. Many survived into the republican constitutions.
The widespread corruption revealed by Commissions of Inquiry, frequent-
ly on the highest levels, and the equally widespread absence of criminal
charges brought against high-level civil servants or Ministers (at least un-
til after a coup which accomplished their downfall) shows that the insti-
tution did not work entirely as anticipated.' 8 Despite evidence of the
massive violation of election laws in Nigeria in the 1964 election,'" the
D.P.P. did not once institute a prosecution. Despite overwhelming evi-
dence of the abuse of preventive detention in Ghana by low-level offi-
cials,20 no prosecution was ever instituted. Allegations of torture of po-
litical prisoners by the police in Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia'
have never been investigated, let alone prosecuted. In no country has the
independent D.P.P. served his full anticipated constitutional function.
The independent D.P.P. did not fulfill the role expectations implied
in his independent constitutional status because formal legal independence
from control by superior authority does not of itself cut the official role-
occupant from society. Whatever the formal declarations about their
freedom from control, judges and prosecutors exist in society. They are
subject to all the controls imposed by society. Prosecutors want to become
judges, or perhaps ministers. To expect them to prosecute the very poli-
ticians to whose favor they owe their original preferment, and to whom
they look for further advancement, is to expect the impossible.
II. THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The ultimate expression of an autonomous legal system is a judiciary
so removed from government that it can sit in judgment upon govern-
17 With the appointment of three Zambians to high judicial office in 1970-72, this has
now changed.
18See generally, R. WRAITH & E. SIMPKINS, CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(1963); Nye, Corruption and Political Development, 61 AM. POL Sa. REV. 417 (1967);
NIGERIA TRIBUNAL TO INQUIRE INTO ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER CONDUCT BY THE
PREMIER OF THE EASTERN REGION: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY IN THE
AFFAIRS OF THE GRANTING OF IMPORT LICENSES (1966).
19 See Vickers, Background to Breakdown in Nigeria: The Federal Elections of 1964.65,
-' AFR Q. 106 (196- : Rake, Nigcria After the Elections: What Happened, 12 AFR. TODAY
5 1: Angdn. rrzn.nma,,.ip in .\'igria. The Federal Elections of 1964.65, 20 INT'L J.
I72 (1965). The author personally observed many of these violations.
20 Asante. Lau, and Society in Ghana, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 1113, 1115; see also, Africa
and the Lau iT W Huthinsun ed. 1968), Harvey, Post Nkrumah Ghana: The Legal Profile
of a Loup, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 1096, 1103-07.
21Id.
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ment itself. The independence constitutions sought to institutionalize this
discontinuity by the device of an independent judiciary.
During all but the last years of the colonial regime, the judges did not
have judicial independence. They held office at the pleasure of the
Crown. 2 In England, by contrast, a judge could only be removed for
misconduct, brought before both Houses of Parliament by a petition for
his removal.
When the independence African Constitutions created judicial inde-
pendence, they went far beyond the colonial position, and even beyond
the English system. In Uganda, for example, puisne judges could be
appointed only on the recommendation of an independent Judicial Ser-
vice Commission with constitutional standing. A judge could only be
removed for inability to perform the functions of his office, or for mis-
behavior, proven first at a hearing before an investigating judicial tribunal,
and again before the Privy Council. -3 Analogous provisions obtained in
the earlier independence constitutions, 4 although in the later ones the
appeal to the Privy Council was omitted.2 5
Appointment to these Judicial Service Commissions was largely lim-
ited to persons holding or having held judicial office. Typically, as in
Zambia, the Chief Justice was the Chairman.2 6 The Judicial Service
Commission was expressly stated to be subject to the control or direction
of no other person or authority.27 A commissioner, once appointed for
a term of three or four years (it varied in the several constitutions) could
be removed by the President but only for inability to discharge the func-
tions of his office, or for misbehavior.2
The judges given such awesome independence -were for the most part
British, and even when they were Africans, they were either products of
the British Colonial Judicial Service, or else British-trained. (Tie first
entirely African-trained lawyers were admitted to the bar in Ghana in
1962). Not only the judges, but the Judicial Service Commissions which
were supposed to appoint and discipline them, were inevitably drawn
22 Terrell v. Sec'y of State for the Colonies, 2 Q. B. 482 (1953). Despite the absence of
formal guarantees of judicial independence, the colonial regulations provided that any proposal
to dismiss a judge had to be referred to the judicial committee of the Privy Council.
2-3 Uganda: THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, art. 92 (1962 t,
24 See Nigeria: THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, arts. 106, 117; Sierra Leone: (Con.
sitution) ORDER-IN-COUNCIL, 2d Schedule; Ghana: THE INDIEPENDENCE CONSTrTUTION,
art. 41 (3); see generally T. ELIAS, THE BRITISH COMMONWEALiT, THE DE3VIlLOPME3NT O!
ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTION, Vol. 10 GHANA AND SIERRA LEoN!: 136 (1962).
25Kenya: THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, art. 173; Malawi: TIlE INDEPENDENCII
CONSTITUTION, art. 77; Zambia, THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, art. 100.
2 Zambia, THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, art. 10- I) (1964).
27 Id., art. 104(4).
28 Id., art. 104 (2c).
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from the roster of the former Colonial Judicial Service-in East and Cen-
tral Africa exclusively white and all but invariably British or South Afri-
can, and in West Africa sometimes Africans who had long been part of
the same Service.
These elaborate provisions for a formally independent judiciary have
been largely maintained since independence. There have been variations:
in Ghana (1960) appointment was by the President,' in Tanzania, by the
President after consultation with the Chief Justice,30 in Malawi, by the
President after consultation with the judicial service commission," in Ni-
geria, by the Prime Minister.' Procedures for removal of judges have
remained unchanged, save in Ghana and Malawi.u In Ghana, Presi-
dent Nkrumah was given power to remove a judge at will.' In Malawi,
a proceeding before an independent tribunal has been changed in favor of
an address by the National Assembly. 5 The term of judicial appoint-
ment remains as it was in the independence constitutions, to retirement
age for indigenous judges, and on contract subject to six months notice of
termination for expatriate judges. (The six month termination provision
has never been invoked in Africa.)3"
In fact, there has been remarkably little overt tampering with the ju-
dicial process by political leaders. Professor Nwabueze, after an exhaus-
tive review, concludes that "with but a few aberrations, the affirmation of
faith in the independence of the judiciary by Commonwealth African
presidents has been matched by their action. Except in Ghana under
Nkrumah, there has been no attempt to employ the courts as an instru-
ment in the power struggle. Nor has the colonial conception of the courts
as a machinery for the enforcement of policy, based upon 'an overriding
necessity for the preservation of good government,' been continued."37
In constitutional cases, at least, there has been precious little need to
intervene. The judges in Africa have been supine in their posture to-
ward laws challenged on constitutional grounds. It is to that phenome-
non that we now turn.
2 9 Ghana, THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION, art. 44(1) (1960).
30 Tanzania: THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION, art. 57(2) (1965).
31 Malawi: Proposals for a Republican Constitution 12 (1966).
3 2 Nigeria: THE REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION art. 112(1) (1962).
3 3 B. NWABUEZE, PARLIMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTIONS IN AFRcA
(forthcoming 1975).
3 4 Ghana: THE REPUBLICAN CONSITUTION, art. 45 (3), (as amended by the Constitution
Amendment Act, 1964, s. 6).
35 Malawi, supra note 31.
36 Nwabueze, supra note 33.
37 Id.
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Ill. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION
In Britain, the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy combined with an
unwritten constitution has meant that the judiciary has had, in theory, no
role in reviewing the validity of legislation. Transported to Africa in
written form, however, the. Westminster model implies a very different
notion of judicial review. 'Under a written constitution, parliament no
longer is supreme. The constitution pre-empts that position. Since in
the nature of things legislation ordinarily precedes adjudication, the judi-
ciary comes to pass upon the validity of legislation after parliament has
acted. Their role impresses final authority upon the courts. After en-
actment, any challenge to the law on constitutional grounds must fall for
decision before the courts, for there is in African countries no other insti-
tution before which such a challenge could easily be mounted. (Consti-
tutional courts exist in West Germany, Italy, and a few other countries.)
The critical challenges which search the reality of judicial indepen-
dence are those which assert that the legislature has enacted a statute
which violates a direct command of the constitution designed to protect
the openness of the political process. These guarantees are typically con-
tained in the "fundamental human rights" provisions of African constitu-
tions. These purport to embody protections of free speech and press, of
freedom from arbitrary arrest, against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the like. 8 Historically, these rights were forged in the political process.
Their origins without exception can be traced back to political trials. A
challenge to a law purportedly violating one of them invariably challenges
government at its most sensitive point, its own perception of its ability to
maintain itself in power. Judicial response to such challenges is a test of
the reality of judicial autonomy from government.
Judicial review of legislation arises in two alternative contexts. In one,
the claim is that the action of the administration is within the scope of a
particular statute, but that the statute on its face or as it has been con-
strued is unconstitutional. In the other, the claim is that while the statute
under which action is claimed to be taken may not in most cases permit
unconstitutional activity, in this case the particular action taken was ultra
vires the statute or constitution. Only the first of these embodies judi-
cial control over lawmakers; in the second case, the judiciary purports to
control the executive branch. Here we discuss only judicial control over
the lawmakers, and hence limit our discussion to constitutional review of
statutes on their face or as construed. We further limit our discussion
to cases involving the fundamental freedoms.
3 8 Zambia, TAE INDEPENDENCE CONSfTUTION, chap. III (1964).
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A. JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO CLAIMS
OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
The judicial response in Africa to claims that fundamental freedoms
have been violated, in cases where there was any real choice within the
constitutional language, has been almost without exception in favor of
governmental action and against the claim of freedom. Only where the
constitutional language permitted no choice have the judges found in fa-
vor of the claim for freedom. Where the claims have involved individ-
ual property rights, courts have usually found against governmental ac-
tion. In order to understand their pattern of decision, it is necessary first
to examine the constitutional language defining the various fundamental
human rights provisions.
1. The Constitutional Provisions
The fundamental rights provisions of the African constitutions find
their prototype in the Nigerian Constitution of 1960.9 They cover a
wide range of the traditional human freedoms: the right to life and to
personal liberty, freedom from slavery and forced labor, freedom from
inhuman treatment, protection from searches and seizures, guarantees of
procedural due process in criminal trials, freedom of conscience, freedom
of expression, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of move-
ment, and protection against discrimination on grounds of race, tribe,
and so forth.
The scope of some of these rights is defined in language that admits
of no exceptions. For example, the Zambian Constitution provides that,
"No person shall be held in slavery or servitude."40 A court called upon
to construe such an unqualified provision is, of course, required to deter-
mine whether the particular state of affairs at issue is subsumed by the
words "slavery" or "servitude," and the court has some scope for discre-
tion in defining these words.
That discretion is, however, very narrow compared to the scope ad-
mitted under most of the provisions. The majority of the human rights
provisions in the African constitutions contain derogation clauses. The
right is first protected in broad terms. A succeeding section then de-
rogates from it by defining circumstances in which that right may be de-
nied. For example, although the above mentioned Zambian Constitution
first provides that, "No person shall be required to perform forced la-
bour,"41 the succeeding section immediately takes away part of what has
3 T. FRANCK, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS 6 (1968).
40 Zambia: THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, ar 16 (1) (1964).
41 Id., art. 16(2).
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
been granted. This second section provides that for the purposes of the
provision, the expression 'forced labour' does not include five situations:
labor required by the sentence of a court; labor required by a person law-
fully detained that is "reasonably necessary' in the interests of hygiene or
the maintenance of the place of detention; labor required of a member of
a "disciplined force" in pursuance of his duties as such; labor required
during time of war or other emergency; and "any labour reasonably re-
quired as part of reasonable and normal communal or other civic obliga-
tions. ' 42 Self-evidently, the scope of judicial discretion in construing the
term "forced labour" is far greater than with respect to the words "slav-
ery" or "servitude."
The derogation clauses reach their maximum ambiguity with respect
to freedoms from deprivation of property and from unlawful searches and
seizures, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom from
discrimination. The freedom of expression provision in the Zambian Con-
stitution, for example, begins with a grand declaration:
22(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in
the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to
hold opinions without interference, freedom to receive ideas and infor-
mation without interference . . . and freedom from interference with his
correspondence.
That broad grant is immediately cut down:
22(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any
law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention to this sec-
tion to the extent that the law in question makes provision-;
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of defense, public
safety, public order, public morality or public health .... and except so
far as that provision or, as may be, the thing done under the authority
thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. 43'
Since any law restricting freedom of expression can easily be hung on
one of the hooks of "public safety, public order, public morality or public
health," the critical issue will always be whether it is not "reasonably jus-
tifiable in a democratic society." This last phrase appears as a leit-motif
in the five categories of human freedoms earlier mentioned.
2. Judicial Response to Constitutional Challenges
Relatively few cases in Africa have tested the scope of these various
provisions. In general, when the scope for discretion for a court has
been relatively limited, courts have held statutes plainly violating the con-
4 2 Id., art. 16(3).
43ld., art. 22(1) and (2).
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stitutional language to be void. For example, in Ubingira v. Uganda,44
petitioners were detained under a deportation ordinance." - That ordi-
nance permitted a minister to deport particular persons from one part of
Uganda to another. Article 28(1) of the Constitution prohibited re-
straints on freedom of movement within Uganda, unless the statute im-
posing the restraint restricted "the freedom of movement or residence
within Uganda of persons generally or any class of persons. . . .'" The
court had no difficulty in finding that the petitioners were not a "class of
persons" and that the statute was therefore unconstitutional.
In Kenya, a statute permitted collective punishment of a tribe or sub-
tribe for stock theft, upon a finding by a magistrate that its members were
"reasonably suspected to be guilty of the theft, or of receiving or retain-
ing, any of the stolen stock, or of being accessories after the fact to such
theft, receiving or retaining. ' 47 Pursuant to that statute, a magistrate im-
posed a collective punishment on some nine hundred Kikuyu for a raid
on some neighboring Masai, supported by warrants of distress. The Su-
preme Court reversed. Article 19 of the Constitution forbade the com-
pulsory taking of property without compensation, except (inter alia) "in
the execution of judgements or orders of a court in proceedings for the
determination of civil rights and obligations" (emphasis supplied). The
Supreme Court denied that a Inagistrate acting in his discretion to impose
collective punishment without hearing each accused was a "court" for
the purposes of section 19.48
Cases involving the very broad derogation clauses, purporting to de-
fine fundamental freedoms in terms of *what is "reasonably required in
a democratic society" have been on the other hand almost uniformly de-
cided against the claims of freedom. In Obi v. D.P.P.,9 for example,
the accused, a member of the House of Representatives and leader of a
small splinter party, was charged with sedition. He had distributed a
pamphlet with the title, "The people: Facts that you must know." It al-
leged that the ministers were motivated by self-interest and not by the
interest of the people at large. The issue of the constitutionality of the
sedition statute was referred to the Supreme Court to determine whether
the sedition statute could stand consistently with the constitutional guar-
antees. The sedition statute was identical with that obtaining during the
colonial era. It provided that the crime of sedition was committed if a
44 [1966] LA. 306(u).
45 Uganda; Cap. 46.
41; Uganda: THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION, art. 28 (3) (c) (1962).
47- Kenya: Stock and Produce Theft Act, c. 355, s. 15 (1) (c).
48Muhuri v. Serebi Ole Hamlpei, S.C. Kenya, Civ. 1021/64.
49 1961 All N.LR. 458.
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statement brought the government into discredit or ridicule, regardless of
the truth or falsity of the statement, and without regard to the repercus.
sions of the statement on public order. The Court held that the statute
was constitutional, for it was justifiable in a democratic society to take
reasonable precautions to preserve public order. They based their deci-
sion on the "dangerous tendency" test long since discarded in the United
States.50
Another example is Ross-Spencer v. Master of the High Court.51 A
statute,52 remaining from colonial days, provided that the intestate es.
tate of any unmarried person who himself or one of whose parents be-
longed to any of the "aboriginal races or tribes" of Africa south of the
equator, would be administered and distributed by customary law. The
Constitution contained the usual guarantee against discrimination, de-
fined as a law
affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or
mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, place or origins,
colour or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to
disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description
are not made subject, or are accorded privileges or advantages which are
not accorded to persons of another such description. 53
The court, in a challenge to the statute, sustained it in the face of the con-
stitutional guarantee, resting its decision upon the derogation clause. That
clause provided that discrimination shall be permitted which subjects per-
sons of different discriptions to a disability or gives them an advantage
"which, having regard to its nature or to special circumstances pertaining
to those persons or to persons of any other such description, is reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society." 4  The court found that the discrimi-
nation at issue was "reasonably justified in a democratic society" under
the conditions of Swaziland.
When, on the other hand, substantial property rights (as opposed
to human rights) were at issue the discretion of the court was almost
invariably exercised to protect the property right. In Nigeria, this oc-
curred with respect to public taking of property." In Kenya, cases con-
cerning discrimination in trade and/or market-stall licensing against non.
50 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
51 Swaziland: Civ. App. No. 1 of 1971, dated April 17, 1972; see Aguda, Discriminatory
Statutory Provisions and Fundamental Rights Provsi,, j/ the ContttutIonj o Botiuana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland, 89 S.A.L.J. 299 (1973).
52 Swaziland: Administration of Estates Proclamation, c. 101 s. 2(3) of 1932 Act, now S.68,
. Swaziland: INDPTPENDaN(E L CONSTI'r" I ION. art. 15( , I.
541d., art. 15(4).
55 Lakanmi v. Art'y Gen. (West Nigeria) SC 58/59 of April 14, 1970.
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citizen Asians have been decided in favor of the property rights of the
targets of the discrimination."'
The list is not long, because the number of constitutional cases has not
been great. The pattern, however, seems clear. When the constitutional
language plainly covers the case at hand, the constitution has been en-
forced. When there has been genuine scope for discretion, it has been
exercised against the claim of freedom in political cases, and for the claim
of property where substantial property rights have been at issue. Follow-
ing are explanations for this emerging pattern of judicial decisions.
B. EXPLANATIONS
Current in the literature are three alternative explanations for judi-
cial decision-making which we may denote the positivist model, the politi-
cal science model, and the process (or realist) model. The first, the
positivist model, is the familiar notion on which law students to this day
cut their teeth. It suggests that "a judge decides his cases by the some-
what mechanical application of legal rules which he finds established in
the legal system. They are, in this sense, binding on him completely apart
from his own judgment as to their fitness for his purpose. This theory
has an historical, if not a logical relationship with the dictates of an
Austinian, positivist conception of law and a rigid notion of the division
of power."57 The model explains the decision by the general proposition
that the law is a gapless web; the judge decides cases when the law is
seemingly ambiguous or absent by reference to "higher order" principles
that are in turn derived from the corpus of the law itself. " It explains
the decisions in Africa concerning fundamental freedoms by the sup-
posed existence of higher order principles which determine the result. It
is a legalistic explanation. 9
In contrast, both the political science and the process models reject the
proposition that it is possible for judges to decide cases involving matters
about which the governing law is ambiguous by resort to the corpus of the
law itself. The argument is so familiar that it will only be indicated. ®
Rules, like the words of which they are composed, have a core mean-
ing and a penumbra. A murder statute imposes liability when the accused
" E.g., Shah Vershi v. Transport Licensing Board, (1970] E. A. 631.
57 Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision Making, 46 CAN. BA. REV. 406, 409 (1968).
Trubeck, Max IVebcr on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 WIS. L REV. 720,
730-31.
59 Id. at 736-39.
':" W. CHAMBLISS AND R. SEHIMAN, LA)x, ORDER, AND PO\XER OF Liw, 120 (1962);
Seidman, The Judicial Process Reconsidered in the Light of Role-Theory, 32 MOD. L REV.
516 (1969).
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"caused" the death. Some factual situations are plainly covered by this
rule. For example, suppose that the accused is found to have taken a gun
which he knew was loaded, aimed it at the forehead of his most bitter
enemy with the intention of killing him, and pulled the trigger, the bullet
entering his enemy's head and killing him. Plainly, this would be a case
of murder: the accused has "caused" the death of another with the req-
uisite intention. It is a "clear case," falling within the core meaning,
Suppose, however, he only injures the victim; and on the way to the
hospital, the injured man is run down and killed by an automobile.
Whether the accused "caused" the death is now debatable; the facts lie
in the penumbra of the word "cause." As a case of first impression, rea.
sonable men could differ over liability for the death. It is a "trouble"
case.
Judges in trouble cases are therefore called upon to determine whether
the statute or other rule in question includes or excludes the particular
facts at hand. To do this, they must determine the precise content of
the words at issue. There must be at least two possible constructions of
the words, or else the case would not be a trouble case. The court, there-
fore, is required to choose between them. By doing so, the court is
in effect legislating. It is determining not what the law is, but what it
ought to be.
The question to be explained, in this view, is why judges make the
choices they do. More specifically, why have judges in Africa almost al.
ways decided trouble cases concerning fundamental freedoms in favor of
government? The answer cannot be found exclusively in the legal order.
The search of the legal order produces only ambiguity and hence the re-
quirement of choice.
To explain why judges choose as they do, the political science model
follows the positivist notion of values. It assumes that values are like
tastes." The explanation of the choices judges make lies in what sort of
men they are-their "values." Glendon Schubert ;tates that
one can understand and explain-at least, on a first level of initial appre.
hension--everything about judicial decision-making on the basis of atti-
tudinal similarities and differences in the decision-making group ...
Both legal norms and legal facts are viewed as functions of attitudes to.
wards the public policy issues in a case.... Why do judges differ in their
attitudes? Judges differ in their attitudes because they have come to ac-
cept some beliefs, and reject others, as the result of their life-experience.
What a judge believes depends upon his religious and ethnic affiliations;
his wife; his economic security and his social status; the kind of education
he has received, both formally and informally, and the kind of legal
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career he has followed before becoming a judge. His affiliations, marital
and socio-economic status, education and career will in turn be largely in-
fluenced by where he was born, and to whom, and when.... There is
still a third level of possible analysis. Why and how does it matter
where a judge was born, and to whom and when? Why and how, in
other words, are judicial attributes determined by cultural differences? ...
The analysis of cultural influences, in both primitive and complex politi-
cal systems, is directed towards an attempt to understand and explain how
and why different judges come to have different attributes.02
This political science explanation is deeply disturbing to common
lawyers. Our legal culture supposes that judicial decision-making is rela-
tively free from subjective value-judgments by judges. Judges cannot
legitimate their decisions as arbiters of conflict if they are perceived to be
biased, and to be basing their decisions not on "the law" but, in the final
analysis, upon the sort of men they are. Further, it is an explanation
which fails to explain some of the data. It may be possible to explain
the decisions of judges in cases where there is discretionary choice in
terms of the judges' "values." Cases in which "conservative" judges af-
firm democratic freedoms cannot be thus explained.
Moreover, the political science explanation may explain in part why
judges choose between alternatives as they do, where there is genuine
room for choice. That choice, however, is not made in an institutional
vacuum. It is made in the context of the most highly structured decision-
making system in the whole panoply of government. An explanation
that selects judicial "attitudes" as the significant variable will explain only
why the choice is made among the alternatives thrown up by the process.
It cannot explain the scope of choice itself or why the judges' values
should play so critical a role.
For lawyers, those are the significant questions. Whatever our myths,
lawyers have always known that the judges' prejudices ("values") influ-
ence a decision. Every practicing lawyer knows that divorce cases ought
to be kept away from some devoutly Catholic judges; that some judges
ake more prosecution-oriented in criminal cases than others; that some are
racists, and others not; and so forth. The problem is not to explain why
particular judges have their crotchets. Rather, it is to explain why these
attitudes have so large an influence in decision-making, despite the preva-
lent legal culture which denies that they should. Why are the available
choices structured as they are? How can the prejudice of judges as a fac-
tor in decision-making be reduced to a minimum? The political sci-
ence explanation of judicial behavior is too limited.
A third explanation considers the appellate courts as decision-making
62 JUDICIAL BEHAVIoR: A READER IN THEORY AD REsEARRIH (Schubert ed. 1964).
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systems. It identifies the norms which define inputs, conversion processes
and feedback systems of appellate courts in Africa by the way in which
they structure choice for judges, and the way in which they require judges
to go about deciding cases. These norms also define the alternative po-
tential rules of constitutional law between which judges must choose.
The operative working rules of the system permit the widest scope for
discretionary choice in constitutional cases and force judges to rely up.
on their personal attitudes and values in making such decisions. Final.
ly, that the judges should decide as they have has been almost inevitable
since the systems of selection and recruitment of appellate judges in Africa
in the post-independence decade have ensured that judges would be ap-
pointed most likely to have conservative and authoritarian values and in-
terests. The remainder of the article will be an examination of the fac-
tors operative in the decision-making systems.
C. APPELLATE COURTS AS DECISON-MAKING SYSTEMS
The ideal stipulated for the role of appellate judges, like other judges,
is that their decisions should be predictable. They should rest on grounds
that can be justified in terms generally acceptable, not upon the judges
idiosyncratic "values" or ideologies. The political scientists have labori-
ously demonstrated what practicing lawyers have always known: that
ideal is not achieved in trouble cases. Why do appellate courts not
achieve that goal? The answer lies in the institutionalized processes of
appellate court decision-making, and to find that answer, the inputs into
the processes must first be defined.
1. Inputs: The selection of issues for adjudication. Courts cannot
fulfil their function as watchdogs of constitutional processes unless cases
come before them raising constitutional issues. Surprisingly, there are
very few constitutional law cases in the African law reports. This re-
sults primarily from the limitations imposed by the adversary system.
Courts in Africa, as elsewhere in the common-law world, are depen-
dent upon litigants to raise issues before them. They have no indepen-
dent supervisory power, and until some litigant is moved to bring a case
before them, they can do nothing about impairments to the fundamental
freedoms or anything else. Constitutional law cases are invariably raised
by private litigants. The government, of course, never attacks its own
activitiy, and the constitutionally independent D.P.P.'s in Africa have nev-
er seen fit to do so.
The institution of private litigation to attack government activity on
constitutional grounds is an expensive, sophisticated affair. It is not apt
to happen unless the accused is wealthy enough to employ competent
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counsel. In the United States, claims of violations of fundamental free-
doms have typically been raised only when a defendant is either himself
wealthy or is supported by some private association interested in the issue
-the NAACP or the American Civil Liberties Union, for example. Such
associations hardly exist in Africa. What cases have been litigated on
constitutional grounds in Africa have been sometimes supported by op-
position political parties. Dr. Chike Obi in Nigeria, whose case I have
already discussed, for example, was the leader of a small splinter political
party.63
Permissible constructions of the constitution. In statutory and con-
stitutional construction alike, the thundering command to lawyers, per-
haps the most important of Hart's rules of recognition, the core of Dean
Pound's "taught law," is that judges, where they can, must apply the law
that is. Laws are written in words. When the competent speakers of the
language could not disagree that a particular set of facts falls under the
language of the governing rule, judges must apply the law as it is written.
Such a case begins and ends with that resounding command.
Cases that have found in favor of a claim for freedom in Africa can
be subsumed under this rubric. For example, the Nigerian constitution,
as in all the African fundamental human rights provisions, contained a
nulla poena sine lege provision: "No person shall be convicted of a
criminal offence unless that offence is defined, and the penalty therefore
is prescribed, in a written law."" There is no derogation clause. The
Nigerian court had no difficulty in overthrowing a conviction for a crime
based on unwritten customary law.65
In Ross-Spencer,0 the Swaziland case already mentioned, the statute
based discriminatory treatment on ethnic origins. The constitution pro-
vided, in the derogation clause, that the prohibition against discrimina-
tory treatment did not apply to any law, insofar as the alleged discrimi-
nation "was reasonably justifiable in a democrative society." The appel-
lant in effect urged that the crucial provision should be construed as
though it contained a further clause: "and no discrimination based on
ethnic origin shall be deemed to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic
society." The appellee claimed that the further clause should read, "and
a discrimination based on ethnic origin shall be deemed to be reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society, where the discrimination is in fact be-
tween classes or groups of people living under different social or eco-
631961 All N.L.R. 458.
"%Nigeria: THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, art. 22(10) (1963).
05 Aoko v. Fagbemi, 1961 All N.LR. 400.
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nomic systems." The vagueness of the constitutional provision opened
wide the door to construction by the Court.
Faced with such latitude in construction, judges must nevertheless se-
lect a construction which is at least arguably within the meaning of the
word in dispute. The relative vagueness or ambiguity of the provision
at issue determines the scope for counsel and court to devise alternative
constructions. A traffic ordinance making it an offense to drive "at an
unreasonable speed" plainly permits much greater scope for discretion
than one which makes it an offense to drive at a speed "in excess of 65
kilometers per hour." A constitutional provision flatly prohibiting slav-
ery or involuntary servitude offers far less scope to judicial construction
than one which prohibits discrimination unless "reasonably justifiable in
a democratic society."
Rules of evidence. Sound decisions about matters of what the law
ought to be can only be based upon notions about what is the case. The
central perception of the American legal realists was that despite the for-
mal, "logical" justifications of positivist judges, their decisions were in fact
based upon notions of the consequence of the proposed rule on society. 7
That requires some information about society and the probable conse-
quences of the rule at issue. The data admitted into the decision-making
process control pro tanto the decisional output.
The kind of evidence demanded by the ordinary work of the trial
courts is sharply limited to the question of whether a claimed set of his-
torical events actually occurred. Did the defendant run down the plain-
tiff on the Great East Road at twelve-thirty on January 17th? Were the
brakes of the defendant's car in good working order? Was he keeping
a good lookout? Did the plaintiff suffer a fracture of the right tibia?
Long judicial experience has developed a set of rules reasonably well
adapted to ensuring that only data related to these quite narrow histori-
cal questions can be considered by the trier of fact. Hearsay is excluded;
opinion is excluded; anything not directly relevant to the precise facts
alleged is excluded, and so forth.
In determining the question of what the law ought to be, however,
these narrow evidential facts are not nearly so important as the kind of
data that legislative committees ordinarily consider: statistics describing
tendencies in the society, sociological and political analyses, and other
"legislative facts." These legislative facts are very difficult to introduce
as evidence in the trial court, for the rules of evidence in general forbid
it. For example, how should survey data be entered when it is based
670. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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upon the hearsay statements of many informants and the enumerators
employed by the researcher?
The political science model of the judicial process argues that this
is irrelevant. Judges will make their decisions on the basis of their "atti-
tudes," not on the basis of data. Those attitudes, however, operate in the
light of the judge's perception of what the case involves. In Ross-Spen-
cer, the court justified its decision that the statute at issue did not discrim-
inate on racial grounds by defining Swaziland society:
The population of Swaziland comprises two classes of people, one living
under a more sophisticated European system, with a fully developed
concept of the individual ownership of property and the right to dispose
of it after death; the other living under tribal customs, in which the basic
system of property is that it belongs to the family and not to the indi-
vidual members of the family and is not transmitted by will.... To this
may be added that, unlike the urbanized parts of the population, the
Swazis in tribal areas mainly live on the produce of their cattle and
ploughing fields and their farming is not conducted on a cash basis but
is subsistence farming...
'The difference between these two systems is the basis of the differen-
tiation contained in s.72 (now 68) of the Administration of Estates
Prodamation.' 68
The implicit assumption was that these two classes of people are de-
fined by their race; and therefore the discrimination based on race in the
statute at issue was justifiable.
In fact, of course, whatever may have been the case in the past, this
vision of race as the crucial dividing line between the two classes defined
by the court is untrue today. There are Swazis who have university edu-
cations, who fill roles as ministers, permanent secretaries, lawyers and
doctors and teachers and university lecturers.
But the rules of evidence make it difficult to bring data of this sort
before the court. Absent legislative facts, courts will draw upon their
acculturated perceptions of the world-their domain assumptions-as the
data upon which to base decisions. If the rules of evidence exclude proof
of the data that judges need to make sound judgments, inevitably they
fall back upon their "values."
Constitutional litigation in the United States has faced this problem.
Lawyers and judges have devised a few rather awkward devices to supply
the court with the necessary social and economic data. The most used is
the so-called "Brandeis Brief," an appendix submitted to the appellate
court summarizing social data about the matters in issue contained in the
68 Swaziland, supra note 46.
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literature.0 .No such device has been institutionalized or even attempted
in Africa.
Personnel. The last input function to be discussed concerns the re-
cruitment and socialization of the appellate judges of Africa. To become
a judge in the Colonial Service required that one be a member of the bar
of either the United Kingdom or of Ireland. In fact, judicial appoint-
ment required some service as a member of the legal staff of the colonial
administration.
These requirements were substantially continued in the independence
constitutions. To be a Justice of Appeal or a High Court justice in
Zambia, for example, the appointee had either (a) to have held high ju-
dicial office, or (b) to have been entitled to practice as advocate or solici-
tor for not less than seven years in a court of unlimited jurisdiction of
some part of the Commonwealth or in the Irish Republic; or (c) to have
been entitled to practice as solicitor in such a court, and to have held the
office of Senior Resident Magistrate, Resident Magistrate, D.P.P., Senior
State Advocate or State Advocate for a total of not, less than seven yearsY'
(These rules were made somewhat less stringent in 1969; three Zambians
have been appointed since). At independence, no Africans in East and
Central Africa were eligible by these standards for appointment to either
the High Court or the Court of Appeal of any country. In West Africa,
there were a few, but they too had been socialized into the colonial legal
systems. Consider, for example, three of the serving judges of the East
African Court of Appeals in 1970.
Sir Charles Newbold, the President, was born in New York of British
parents, educated in Barbados, and at Oxford and Gray's Inn. He had
served as Legal Secretary for the East African High Court; had been a
justice and Vice President of the Court of Appeal and a member of the
Legislative Assembly of Kenya for thirteen years immediately prior to
independence and through the Mau-Mau period. Mr. Justice Eric J. E,
Law was born in Burma, educated at Wrekin College, at Cambridge and
the Middle Temple. He had been Crown Counsel in Nyasaland, Resi-
dent Magistrate in Tanganyika, a judge in Zanzibar, and a judge in
Tanganyika before promotion to the Court of Appeal in 1965. Mr. Jus-
tice John Farley Spry was educated at Perse School Cambridge, and at
Cambridge University. He had been Assistant Registrar of Titles and
Conveyances in Uganda, Chief Inspector of Land Registration in Pales-
6 9 See generally C. AUERBACH, L. GARRISON, J. HuRsT, and S. MERMIN, THn LEGAL
PROCESS 99-130 (1961); Vose, The National Consttmer'r Council and the Brand'is Brief, I
MIDWEST J. OF POL. Sc. 267 (1957); Wyzanski, A Trial Judgc'i Freedom and Responsibiliiy,
65 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1952).
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tine; Registrar General of Tanganyika, of Kenya, and again of Tang-
anyika; a member of the Legal Service Commission of Tanganyika; Prin-
cipal Secretary of the Public Service Commission; and a Puisne Judge of
the High Court of Tanganyika before elevation to the Court of Appeal.
Between them, these three judges alone had 64 years of service in the
colonial administration before independence.,Z
The Colonial judicial officers tended to come from the same class and
social backgrounds as Colonial Service officers generally: "good" family,
public school, Oxbridge. That they would tend to find the authoritarian
ideologies of the Colonial Service congenial was, perhaps, to be expected.
It is obviously unreliable to predict from the antecedents of a particular
individual his probable world-view or ideology. (Friedrich Engels, the
co-founder of Marxism and a passionate socialist, was a prosperous Birm-
ingham manufacturer who rode to the hounds regularly on Thursdays.)
But the political science model is demonstrably right when viewing mem-
bers of a social group or class as a whole: the central tendency of a class
will be towards an ideology consistent with its interests. The values of
persons deeply socialized into a particular bureaucracy will tend to accord
with that bureaucracy's deepest convictions.
The ideology of judges socialized into the Colonial Service and the
Colonial Judicial Service was apt to be consonant with the authoritarian
ideals of the Colonial Services. The notion of support for the govern-
ment of the day was too deeply engrained in that Service for colonial
judges readily to admit of its very opposite.
The judges who occupied the appellate benches of Africa were in the
main educated in England, and admitted to the Bar there. (In the former
High Commission Territories-Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland-they
were educated mainly in South Africa, and had prior judicial experience
there. Many have been actually seconded from the South African bench
directly to these three countries. A few judges have a British West In-
dian background).
That education was dominated by the ideologies of analytical positiv-
ism. In the universities of England, so late as the 1950's:
Legal philosophy continued to be concerned primarily with the lin-
guistic problems involved in the analysis of doctrinal issues; books about
precedent and evidence still tended to be collections of rules about prece-
dent and evidence. The same was true for statutory interpretation.
There was little attempt to discover the fundamental bases of precedent,
evidence or statutory interpretation or the role they played in the legal
process .... International law was still generally taught independently
71 WHO'S WHO IN KENYA, 1963-65 (n.d.); Kenya: 1966 Staff Lift (Nairobi: Govern-
ment Printer, 1966).
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from international relations and diplomatic history. Constitutional law
was Still divorced from politics and political science; and administrative
lawyers still regarded themselves as having little concern with the prob-
lems of the civil service or public administration. Meanwhile, in widely
studied subjects like tort and contract, there was still remarkably little re-
search in practical problems-whether it was scope of arbitration, the de-
velopment of commercial practices, the growth of: contract outside the
courts, or the impact of insurance on the law of torts. 72
A visiting American academic has been quoted as saying that in England,
"the majority of law teachers appear not to regard it as their task to go
outside the traditional doctrinal framework used by English judges in ra-
tionalizing their decisions. ' 73 Judges whose legal education was limited
to the Inns of Court had, if anything, even a narrower training, thus en-
suring legalistic law-finding.
In addition to their educational backgrounds, the interests of the
judges affect the decision-making process. The somewhat idealistic the-
ory underlying the institutions of the independent judiciary is that this
independence insulates the judges from pressure arising from the hope
of personal rewards or fear of penalties. Judicial independence ordinar-
ily reaches its maximum effectiveness with members of the highest ap-
pellate court, who have reached the pinnacle of their careers. Trial
judges, however, live always in hope of appointment to a higher bench,
and insofar as appointment rests with political authorities, no doubt there
are pressures operating upon them at least in political cases. Even appel-
late judges, however, must live in a social mileu. They have their own
reference groups, whose reactions inevitably must have some effect upon
their decision-making.
Robert Martin puts it sharply enough:
We must also ask whether the whole concept of the independent ju-
diciary is illusory. Judges are members of the ruling class by birth or
assimilation (regardless of what that class may be) and hired employees
of the State who depend ultimately on the coercive power of the execu-
tive for the enforcement of their decisions. To disregard these condi-
tions in an attempt to be totally independent would be meaningless.1 4
The judges of Africa are plainly part of the political elite. Their interests
are tied to the status quo.
That at independence most of the higher court judges were expatri-
ate created special pressures. It was part of the conventional wisdom
7 2 B. ABEL-SMITH and R. STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS: A SOCIOLOGICAL
STUDY OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: 1750-1965 372 (1967).
73 Quoted in id. at 368.




of the Colonial Service that expatriate officers were more independent of
particularist pressures than African officers."h Free from the claims of
family and village, the expatriate officer, it was believed, perceived his in-
terest to be in advancement within the Service and an eventual honorable
retirement in England. He would, therefore, be likely to bring to deci-
sion-making the impersonal standards which the Service purported to up-
hold.
Whatever the case before independence, as applied to administrative
officers, expatriate judges after independence had particular disabilities,
making it more likely than less that they would decide cases with a wary
eye on the political winds. The judiciary as a whole depends for its ulti-
rnate support upon the goodwill with which it is regarded. It is the most
fragile branch of government. It lacks a constituency that perceives itself
as represented by it, and it lacks guns in default of legitimacy.
Expatriate judges in Africa were well aware of the tenuousness not
only of their tenure, but of the whole structure of judicial power. A
member of the East African Court of Appeals, when taxed with the
legalistic quality of that court's opinions, has said that to address openly
the policy questions which were at issue would lead to the withdrawal
of politically sensitive cases from the court of jurisdiction."0 African
governments would not likely tolerate expatriate judges seeking to use
judicial power to overthrow governmental decisions on matters per-
ceived by government as touching upon its power to govern.
2. Conversion Processes. Precious little is known about how judges
in fact come to their decisions. A great deal is known about the justifi-
cations they give for them, for appellate judges typically write opinions,
purporting to justify their decisions. I examine here: (a) the relation-
ship between opinions, justification, and decision-making; and (b) the
sorts of justifications given for African decisions.
Opinions, Justifications, Decision-making. Courts write opinions
mainly for other judges and lawyers to read. They purport to give rea-
sons which the deciding judge believes will persuade his professional
peers that the decision matches the appropriate rules for justification.
Obviously, opinions do not disclose the process by which the judge
reached his decision. What counts is that they follow the appropriate
rules for justification. A judge in the common law tradition who tried to
justify his decision by blatantly emotional appeals to prejudice or politics
75 J. MACKINTOSH, NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT AND PoLrrIcs 28, 42, 54 (1966).
-6 In conversation with the author, December 1969 in Dar es Salam.
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would not receive the esteem of his fellow professionals. They have
been socialized to adhere to different standards."-
To justify a decision is to control the decision-making process pro
tanto. A judge must be a fool to come to a decision which he is incapable
of justifying pursuant to the rules of justification. Opinions, by requir-
ing the judge to justify his conclusion, at the same time impose constraints
on the process of decision-making. They define the conversion processes
of appellate courts.
Opinion Styles in Africa. The principal goal set for the judge as
arbiter is that his own personal values should enter as little as possible
into the decision. The prescribed system of justification, under which
the judge must write his opinions, will help determine the extent to which
that ideal is achieved.
In the United tSates, three periods of opinion-writing can be distin-
guished. The first, labelled by Karl Llewellyn as the Grand Style, came
to an end in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Faced by a case
of first impression, judges justified their decision by frank appeals to
policy. In the celebrated case of Priestley v. Fowler,"8 Lord Abinger
said, "It is admitted that there is no precedent for the present action....
We are therefore to decide the question upon general principles, and in
so doing we are at liberty to look at the consequences of a decision the one
way or the other."
This candid justification in terms of social consequences disappeared
in the English and American opinions of the later nineteenth century.
It was replaced by the Formal Style. Based jurisprudentially upon ana-
lytical positivism, these opinions presume that the law is a "gapless web."
Seeming ambiguities and incoherencies can be resolved through the use
of reason alone, operating with materials drawn only from the legal order
itself-cases and statutes. The Formal Style reflected all the forces seek-
ing to make the legal order match the Weberian ideal.
The history of opinion styles in Africa follows the same pattern as
the common law generally.-, We examine specifically opinion styles in
East Africa. Two periods in the style of these opinions may be defined.
The first lasted until well into the decade of the 1920's, and with respect
to procedural matters, even for some time after that. In this period,
opinions tended to be terse; they, rarely cited extensive authority; a high
proportion of the cases were really "clear case" matters, in which the
appellate court was merely correcting an obvious error by the local magis-
77 CHAMBLISS and SEIDMAN, supra note 55, at 118.
783 Mees. & Wels. 1 (Exchequer, 1837).




trate. 'When there were disputed issues of law, however, the court vali-
dated their opinions almost exclusively in the Formal Style.
For example, in Re a Reference"' there was at issue the admissibility
into evidence of an unstamped promissory note, which required the court
to construe ambiguous language both in section 35 of the Indian Stamp
Act, and in the order of the Secretary of State applying that Act to East
Africa. Eleven years before, in 1904, Judge Hamilton had examined the
problem in an earlier case and had decided in favor of admissibility. In
that case, he had only said that "any instrument to which the first provi-
sion of section 35 applies may be admitted into evidence on payment of
the duty with or without penalty as the Court thinks fit in the circum-
stances of the case."'" No argument was made to justify the decision.
Again, in 1915, the same judge was faced with the same question. He
now came to precisely the opposite answer: "Now, it is clear that the first
provision to section 35 does not apply to promissory notes, for a promis-
sory note is expressly made an exception to the proviso. The law on this
point appears, I regret to say, to have been incorrectly stated by myself
so far back as 1904... "82
It is obvious that if anything was clear, it was that the law on the
point was not clear. Yet Judge Hamilton did not justify either his earlier
decision, or its reversal.
The reason for this extraordinary want of reasons for decisions prob-
ably reflects two confluent factors. The first was merely practical. Ade-
quate reference books to the English law were simply missing in East
Africa. Case after case was decided on the basis not of the original re-
port of precedents, but a brief quote or footnote reference in a textbook.
The second arose from the fact that the lower courts in East Africa were
manned not by trained judges, socialized into the legal profession, but
laymen working in the dual capacity of magistrate and District Officer.
They would not question the decision of appellate courts with their trained
judges. The early opinions were brief because they needed only to an-
nounce the law, not to persuade the profession of their correctness.
One can hypothesize that the increased sophistication of the opinions
reflects the changing composition of the judiciary and of the legal pro-
fession. There were more lawyers. Resident Magistrates tended to be
legally qualified. Better libraries were available. The brief opinions that
had accompanied earlier decisions no longer would do. The judges
o 6 E Afr. L.R. 45 (1915).
81 Kanji v. Admin. Perez Din, I . Afr. LRL 61 (1904).
L6 E. Afr. LR. 45.
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adopted the system of formal justification in which they had been trained
in England.
In the United States, but not in England, a third period of opinion
writing, the Realist period, increasingly represents the dominant trend. In
the Realist period, the earlier Grand Style has been resurrected. Judges,
influenced by American legal realism, increasingly write their opinions
frankly addressing the policy issues. The celebrated Supreme Court
judgment in the desegregation cases83 is an example.
Emergent independence in Africa has created a new situation there.
Sir Charles Newbold has written that a "blind adherence" to precedent
when circumstances have changed "and the needs of the community are
vastly different" can do a considerable amount of harm to the community
which is not compensated by any certainty in the law. "When a prece-
dent has outlived its usefulness, [it is better] to say so and the community
[will) have the benefit of a clear-cut change in principle, of a decision
based on modern requirements or based on a sounder logic.... . 4  To
determine whether a precedent meets "modern requirements" of course
requires a justification in terms of the social consequences of the proposed
new rule, not merely a justification in terms of precedent and statute.
The new situation therefore demands a return to Grand Style deci-
sions. In a period of rapid social, political and economic change, in
which every African state is consciously seeking to guide its economic
and political destinies according to the guiding perspectives of its govern-
ment, what is required is what Weber called substantively rational law-
making, rather than legalism. Planned development requires that the
rules adopted consciously follow articulated general principles, and that
their anticipated consequences accomplish those principles. The justifi-
cation of opinions can only match the imperatives of modern Africa when
they meet these requirements. They will match them only when the
bench and bar in Africa have come to accept the legitimacy of Grand
Style justifications.
By the same token, to rely upon the Formal Style makes the social
utility of decisions apt to be a matter of chance, not conscious choice. As
I have suggested, the opinion not only validates the decision in the eyes
of other judges and lawyers, it is also a test for the deciding judge that
his decision can be justified. The Formal Style, based as it is on the fun-
damental fallacy that the law is a gapless web, and that even trouble
cases do not require a policy-choice by judges, inevitably balances opinions
on what Holmes called an inarticulate premise. To fail to articulate
83 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
84 Sir C. Newbold, The Values of Precedents arising from Cases decided in East Africa as
Compared with those Decided in England, 2 E.A.L. REv. 1, 9 (1969).
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premises is to ensure that the personal predilictions of the judge will have
full sway sub silentio.
The more ambiguous the rule to be construed, the wider the scope for
policy choice. Constitutional norms are the most ambiguous in all the
law. To rely upon the Formal Style in justifying constitutional decisions
gives the widest play for the personal "values" or biases of the judge. It
makes it impossible for the judge to fulfill the role-expectation of ration-
ality in decision-making, despite the cloud of chop-logic with which For-
mal Style opinions are invariably clothed.
The Style of Justification in Constitutional Cases. The essence of the
Formal Style of justification was set out by the principal technical ad-
visor, an Irish solicitor, to the Ghanaian authorities in drafting the 1960
Republican Constitution. He wrote that the "formal principles govern-
ing Ghana's republican constitution" were:
1. It is a mechanism, and all its operative provisions are intended to
have the precise effect indicated by the words used-no more and no
less.
2. It is drafted on the assumption that the words used have a fixed
and definite meaning and not a shifting or uncertain meaning; that they
mean what they say and not what people would like them to mean; and
that if they prove unsuitable they will be altered formally by Parliament
and not twisted into new meaning by 'interpretation'.
3. It leaves no powers unallocated; those not reserved to the people
are exercisable by the authorities established by it.
4. In its original form, or as for the time being expressly amended,
it overrides any inconsistent law whenever made.
5. It assumes that legitimate inferences will be drawn by the reader,
but that he will not transgress the rules of logic-as by drawing an in-
ference from one provision which is inconsistent with the express words
of another provision.
6. It needs to be read as a whole and with care.85
Commenting upon these "principles," S. 0. Gyandeh has summarized
their impact. Together, they hold
(i) That the provisions of the Constitution have a determinate
meaning for all time, and that this determinate meaning is discoverable
from the plain or ordinary meaning of the words used.
(ii) When faced with the task of applying any provision of the
Constitution to a givien situation, the decision-maker is precluded from
any creative activity. He is merely to lay the given situation alongside
the relevant provision invoked, and it should be clear to him whether
the provision is applicable to the situation or not.86
1 5F. BENNION, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 111 (1962).
86 S. Gyandeh, Prindples of Judicial Interpretwaion of the Republican Comltitution of
Ghana, 3 UNIv. OF GHANA LJ. 38 (1968).
1974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
A Kenyan judge quoted an Indian case87 with approval to the same
effect; "An argument founded on what is claimed to be the spirit of the
Constitution is always attractive, for it has a powerful appeal to senti-
ment and emotion; but a court of law has to gather the spirit of the Con-
stitution from the language of the Constitution. What one may believe
or think to be the spirit of the Constitution cannot prevail if the language
of the Constitution does not support that view."88 These rules summarize,
in short, the Formal Style of justification.
That style has its own virtue. In clear cases, where reasonable men
could not dispute the meaning of words, the Formal Style requires that
judges enforce the law as it plainly reads. Since the judge has no choice
in such cases, he must subordinate his own predelictions, prejudices, and
biases to the statute or constitution.
The difficulty with the Formal Style arises when courts are faced with
cases where there might be a genuine disagreement about the meaning of
the constitutional or statutory language involved. As Bennion's state-
ment makes clear, the Formal Style assumes that words have one, and
only one, meaning, in all times and places, and that their boundaries are
always sharp. That assumption, plainly untrue, tends to become a blinder
upon the search for ambiguity. Insensitive to the potential for ambiguity,
courts too often decide cases as if there were one and only one meaning
for the language at issue, when in truth the words are ambiguous.
A few examples may be adduced. In the Kenyan case just men-
tioned the testimony of the accused had been taken compulsorily under
the Exchange Control Ordinance. He was then prosecuted, and his own
earlier testimony used to convict, pursuant to a provision of the Exchange
Control Ordinance. He appealed on the ground that that provision was
unconstitutional under the self-incrimination provision of the Kenyan
Constitution that "No person who is tried for a criminal offense shall be
compelled- to give evidence at his trial." His claim was denied. The
plain meaning of the constitutional provision only prohibits compelling
the accused to give testimony at his trial. What compulsion was used
against the accused took place at the Exchange Control hearings. That
the phrase "at his trial" was ambiguous under the circumstances-the
word "trial" might have been held to include the proceedings in which
the evidence was compulsorily taken as. well as the courtroom proceed-
ings-was never mentioned by the court. In consequence, the court made
a far-reaching policy decision seemingly without being aware that it was
87 Kashawa Menon v. State of Bombay, 1951 S.C.R. 228.
88 Republic v. El Mann, 1969 E.A. 357, 360 (High Court, Kenya).
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doing so, and hence without taking into account the sorts of considera-
tions that are appropriate to the determination of policy.
Re Akotos" is a second example of the disastrous consequences of
Formal Style justifications in constitutional trouble cases. That case chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Ghana's Preventive Detention Act, relying
in part upon a Declaration of Principles set forth in Article 13 of the
Constitution. That Article required the President upon assumption of
office to declare his adherence to the following propositions, among
others:
That freedom and justice should be honored and maintained . . . That
no person should suffer discrimination on grounds of ... political belief.
That subject to such restrictions as may be necessary for preserving
public order, morality or health, no person shall be deprived of freedom
of religion, of speech, of the right to move and assemble without hin-
drance or of the right of access to courts of lawY0
The petitioner, a political opponent of the President, was detained with-
out hearing or trial under the enabling statute. The question to be de-
cided was whether the Preventive Detention Act was unconstitutional
under the terms of Article 13.
The Court denied the petition. The Chief Justice, in his opinion,
justified the decision in large part on the narrowest of linguistic grounds:
It will be observed that Article 13(1) is in the form of a personal dec-
laration by the President and is in no way part of the general law of
Ghana. In the other parts of the Constitution where a duty is imposed
the word 'shall' is used but throughout the declaration the word used is
'should'. In our view the declaration merely represents the goal which
every President must pledge himself to attempt to achieve. It does not
represent a legal requirement which can be enforced by the courts.91
The Court therefore came to the rather surprising conclusion that Article
13 did not form part of the law of Ghana. The Court blinded itself to
alternative possible solutions-for example, to create out of Article 13
a presumption that the President would not violate his oath. Using that
presumption at least to read into the Preventive Detention Act a violation
of that oath would have required no greater strain on its language than
occurs whenever a court reads a mens rea requirement into a criminal
statute that on its face imposes liability without fault.
No place has the Formal Style opinion demonstrated its vacuity so
clearly as with respect to attempts to construe the syballine phrase,
"reasonably justifiable in a democratic society." In Patel v. Attorney-
11 1961 GHANA L. R. 523.
,wn Ghana: THE REPUBUCAN CONSTITUTION, art. 13 (1960).
91 1961 GHANA LR. 523, 535.
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General,92 regulation 35 of the Exchange Control Regulations of 1965
was attacked as violative of article 19 of the Zambian Constitution. The
regulation empowers any authorized officer who reasonably suspects that
any postal article contains contraband under the Exchange Control Regu-
lations to seize it without warrant. An officer seized some packets be-
longing to the accused. The packets contained Zambian currency being
illegally exported. Objection was made to their admissibility, on the
ground of the constitutional prohibition against unlawful searches and
seizures. That constitutional provision contained the usual derogation
clause. The main issue was the meaning of the words "reasonably justi-
fiable in a democratic society."
Plainly, these words require a judge to make policy determination;
What scope for freedom from search and seizure is required by a "demo-
cratic" society? The critical word is so vague that the judge must define
it; and, by defining it, give it content. In Patel, the judge first quoted
with obvious disapproval Humpty Dumpty's famous words in Through
the Looking Glass: "When I use a word,... it means just what I choose
it to mean-neither more or less." He then went to the Oxford English
Dictionary to define the word "democracy," emerging with the not very
helpful definition that it means "government by the people." He cited
two American and one Indian case emphasizing that a free government
implies broad privileges of free speech and press, but added that "all
this is, however, subject to the security of the state (see American Com-
munications v. Douds, 340 U.S. 268 (1951), so that some degree of con-
trol is permissible in the interests of security but only so far as is reason-
ably necessary for that purpose." He cited Entick v. Carrington"3 for the
proposition that general search warrants were not consistent with a dem-
ocratic society, and thus reasoned that a warrantless search must also be
invalid. He then referred to the American cases "which indicated a fun-
damental difference between the search of premises and the search of a
motorcar, ship or vehicle and between a search for ordinary criminal
purposes and a search for contraband." He then accepted the analogy
between a moving vehicle and articles in the post, which are also in transit.
On this basis, he held regulation 35 "justifiable in a democratic society."
Obviously, an equally "logical" argument could have been constructed
to come to the opposite conclusion. Why the judge came to the one con-
clusion and not the other cannot be found in the decision, despite its great
length. The Formal system of decision-making maximized the space
within which the judge's personal "values" could roam.
92 Selected Judgments, Zambia, No. 33 of 1968, 111.
93 19 Sr. Tr. 1030 (1765).
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In summary, decisions in African constitutional cases may best be ex-
plained on the basis of the following salient features of the decision-
making system. First, because the raising of constitutional cases depends
upon the initiative of private litigants or of the D.P.P., and because that
initiative has been lacking, there has been a remarkable paucity of consti-
tutional cases. Second, the derogation clauses of the fundamental free-
doms provisions are so ambiguous as to permit almost any law to be held
either tonstitutional or unconstitutional under them. Third, the legalistic
Formal Style system of justification prevents the courts from openly ad-
dressing unresolved policy issues and forces them to make choices based
upon their acculturated, unexamined "values." Further, the rules of evi-
dence preclude presentation of "legislative facts" requisite to considered
policy-making. Finally their constitutional decisions reflect the decision-
making system: in clear cases judges adhere to the literal language of the
constitution; in cases where there is room for discretionary choice they are
controlled by their acculturated value sets and find against the claim for
freedom in cases concerning civil and political liberties, and in favor of
claims of protection of individual property rights. The analogy to the
Supreme Court of the United States during the period prior to the great
Court revolution of 1937 could not be more dear.
CONCLUSION
One idea embodied in the constitutional arrangements of the inde-
pendent African countries was that the courts should stand as "sentinels
of freedom."94 It was an idea doomed to failure. It was not destined to
failure (as is frequently assumed) because of denials of notions of for-
mal judicial independence, or because African politicians have otherwise
perverted the judicial process. Rather, it was doomed because of the
structure of appellate courts as institutions in the African milieu. The
Formal Style of justification for opinions permitted maximum play for
the judges' unexpressed "values" or domain assumptions. The method of
controlling inputs guaranteed that the judges would not be presented
with data which might challenge those assumptions. The systems of
recruiting and socializing judges ensured that they would be drawn from
strata and groups who would tend to approve restrictions upon political
freedoms in favor of government "stability." At the same time, the
norms of appellate decision-making ensured that where the pertinent lan-
guage was unambiguous, the courts would decide clear cases in accordance
with unambiguous constitutional meaning. The constitutional language
'94 Grove, The Sentinels of Liberty?-The Nigerian judiciary and Fundamenta Rights,
7 J. AFR. LAW No. 3, 152-71 (1963).
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with respect to the fundamental freedoms, however, was in most cases so
broad and ambiguous that the judges' domain assumptions, usually un-
articulated, had unbounded arenas within which to roam. In any event,
African appellate courts have been singularly ineffective sentinels to pro-
tect the freedoms that purported to underlay African political systems.
